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Résumé : Les concepts de « collectif » et « social » sont couramment confon-
dus, via des affirmations à propos des faits collectifs et de leur nécessité jus-
tifiées par des éléments de preuve mobilisant uniquement des faits sociaux ou
interactionnistes. C’est notamment le cas dans l’argument de Harry Collins en
faveur de la connaissance tacite. Mais l’erreur est profondément enracinée dans
l’histoire de la philosophie, via la notion de présuppositions partagées popula-
risée par le néo-kantisme, lequel a confondu les énoncés logiques de nécessité
avec les énoncés factuels à propos des groupes. Les affirmations néo-kantiennes
de ce type se heurtent à des difficultés partagées par l’argument de Collins en
faveur de la connaissance tacite collective. La solution alternative, un compte
rendu complètement social de nos capacités de compréhension et d’interpré-
tation, évite ces difficultés, et permet un modèle de la connaissance tacite
qui satisfait les supposés besoins d’explication que la partie « collective » du
compte rendu de Collins vise à satisfaire.
Abstract: The concepts of “collective” and “social” are routinely confused,
with claims about collective facts and their necessity justified by evidence
that involves only social or interactional facts. This is the case with Harry
Colllins’ argument for tacit knowledge as well. But the error is deeply rooted
in the history of philosophy, in the notion of shared presuppositions popu-
larized by neo-Kantianism, which confused logical claims of necessity with
factual claims about groups. Claims of this neo-Kantian kind have difficulties
shared by Collins’s argument for Collective Tacit Knowledge. The alternative,
a fully social account of our capacities of understanding and interpretation,
avoids these difficulties and allows for a model of tacit knowledge that serves
the supposed explanatory needs that the “collective” part of Collins’s account
purports to meet.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 17 (3), 2013, 75–92.
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In Tacit and Explicit Knowledge, [Collins 2010], hereafter TEK, Harry
Collins argues against the use of a certain model of tacit knowledge, associated
with the standard example of knowledge of how to ride a bicycle, as a model
for all tacit knowledge. He distinguishes this kind of embodied knowledge,
which he calls “Somatic” Tacit Knowledge, from two other kinds, “Relational”
and “Collective” Tacit Knowledge. Collective Tacit Knowledge as Collins con-
ceives it falls into a familiar category: it is a collective object. Collective
objects are tempting explanatory devices for various reasons, but they also
have characteristic problems, one of which Collins recognizes but makes no
attempt to solve, namely the problem of transmission, or what Collins calls
“the deep mystery” of “how to make explicable the way that individuals acquire
Collective Tacit Knowledge” [TEK, 138]. Put differently, this is the problem
of how a collective object gets into individual heads. Collins does argue, and
argued in the past, that at least some kinds of tacit knowledge can be acquired
only through direct contact with others who possess it. This suggests an al-
ternative explanation of the phenomenon of tacit knowledge itself, one that is
“social” or interindividual rather than “collective”. My concern in this article
will be with the differences between these two kinds of explanation and the
status of social explanations as rivals to collective explanations, especially in
connection with tacit knowledge and Collins’s examples.
1 Social vs. collective
The terms “social” and “collective” are often used interchangeably, or without
distinction, and this lack of discrimination is especially evident in the cognitive
science literature. In the literature of social theory and sociology, in contrast,
the terms are sharply distinguished, at least in theoretically sensitive con-
texts, and typically denote explanatory alternatives with different ontological
implications. Indeed, the terms represent an important dividing line between
traditions. Émile Durkheim made a point of criticizing his rival Gabriel Tarde
for replacing
the expression “collective psychology” by “interpsychology”. The
first expression appeared to him to be tainted with ontology,
because it seems to imply that there is a collective psychology
proper. [Durkheim 1906, 133]
The issue marked a major fault line within French sociology. One of the
cardinal points made by Tarde was that the mechanisms for explaining so-
cial phenomenon involved processes between individuals, notably imitation,
which incidentally plays a large role in cognitive science discussions of social
interaction, rather than anything “collective” [Tarde 1890]. This led to the
use of the term “social” as a way of distinguishing from and contrasting to
“collective”. Durkheim of course rejected this bottom-up approach to the ex-
planation of social phenomena. Durkheim’s sociologization of Kant involved
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the idea that there were collective, shared, psychological contents, contents ir-
reducible to the processes of individual psychology, and that appeals to these
collective contents were necessary to account for social life. His approach was
explicitly “collective”. This fault line has persisted. In American sociology,
movements such as Symbolic Interactionism rejected any such explanations,
and attempted to explain such things as “significant symbols”, to use the term
of G.H. Mead [Mead 1934], in terms of social interaction, but also from the
bottom up, as products of the interactive process.
Outside of these contexts, however, confusion in the use of these terms
reigns. “Collective” is used, especially in the context of cognitive science, for
processes that are not collective but social in the sense of interindividual.
Nevertheless, “social” is routinely used in these literatures in a way that does
not discriminate between “collective” and “social” in the sense of social inter-
action. The point may be illustrated by a text by Michael Tomasello. On the
one hand, he uses the “collective” language of “shared intentionality”:
Underlying these two singular characteristics of human culture—
cumulative artifacts and social institutions—are sets of species-
unique skills and motivations for cooperation [...]. [W]e may
refer to the underlying psychological processes that make these
unique forms of cooperation possible as “shared intentionality”.
[Tomasello 2009, xiii]
On the other hand, when he explains the underlying psychological processes,
they are social; they involve interaction between individuals, where one in-
dividual is engaged with other individuals in ways that transform the other
individuals,
First, humans actively teach one another things, and they do not
reserve their lessons for kin. [...] Second, humans also have a
tendency to imitate others in the group simply in order to be like
them, that is, to conform. [Tomasello 2009, xiv]
Imitation is an imperfect one-on-one process which does not produce collec-
tively standardized results; teaching might be designed to produce standard-
ized results as external behavior, but what people take away from the actual
interactive experience of being taught, the internal psychology, is individual.
They may be good or bad at arithmetic. They are disciplined to be standard in
the answers they give to arithmetic questions. Being disciplined and desiring
to conform produce social results. The skills and the desires allow teams to
work together. But “shared intentionality” implies something more, a common
mental content together with a common motivation. This parallels the issue
in Collins: the idea of Collective Tacit Knowledge implies something more
than that which may be transmitted by the mechanisms involved in personal
contact mentioned by Tomasello or described by Collins himself.
Some of the confusion about these terms is legitimate. It is not always
obvious which term is the correct one. There are widely used but problematic
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notions, such as “sharing”, that make sense primarily as a collective fact, but
which might also be understood as part of interaction, for example in relation
to joint attention, with “social” but not “collective” implications. Yet it is
easy to slide from facts about interaction to collective claims, despite their
very different implications. Moreover, there are definitional issues that confuse
matters. One may of course redefine the notions of “sharing” and “intention” in
a way that eliminates the oddity of saying that multiple people have the same
intention. One might redefine “intention” in terms of some common external
goal, for example, such as winning a war, and treat as “sharing” anything
intentional directed toward that goal. But this merely has the effect of allowing
a huge variety of very different intentional and psychological causal structures
and backgrounds, involving, for example, different and conflicting beliefs about
the world, to count as “the same” intention, and thus something that could be
said to be shared. But this is not a “collective” notion of intention in the sense
that there is significant shared or collective internal or psychological content.
Indeed, we may have very different concepts even of an external goal such as
winning a war.
2 Collins and the idea of Collective Tacit
Knowledge
In this article I will try to sort out some of these distinctions in relation to the
case of tacit knowledge, which presents them in a particularly clear form. It
is one of the virtues of Tacit and Explicit Knowledge [TEK] that it sharpens
this issue. My basic thesis will be a simple one. Claims about “collective”
facts normally depend on transcendental, “conditions for the possibility of”,
arguments; the actual empirical evidence only supports non-collective “social”
claims. This argument has direct bearing on the problem of tacit knowledge.
One role of the concept of tacit knowledge has been to account for mutual
interaction and understanding. In this role tacit knowledge is assumed to be
shared, a common possession of those interacting, for example as speakers of
a common language, and that this shared tacit knowledge is a condition for
the possibility of the kind of communication through meaningful speech that
language permits. Another role, however, has been to account for highly indi-
vidual skills and competences, such as the skill of using one’s own physically
distinctive body to perform complex tasks such as riding a bicycle. These roles
are very different, and not obviously congruent, a point made by Collins.
Collins argues that the “bicycle” model of tacit knowledge, based on the
standard example of embodied but inarticulable tacit knowledge of how to
ride a bicycle, is unable to account for certain facts that a full account of tacit
knowledge should account for. A “collective” kind of tacit knowledge would
explain what is needed. This is a paradigmatic argument from explanatory
necessity, with a transcendental argument as a solution, though Collins puts
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his claim somewhat differently, as a claim about what the most parsimonious
explanations is. Whether this self-explication is appropriate is a question to be
dealt with later. But there are two problems with it. In the first place, Collins
does not consider alternatives, so it is unclear what it is more parsimonious
than. The other is that ontologically, it is anything but parsimonious. Collins
joins a long line of historical figures as well as contemporary thinkers who
believe that there is some sort of collective mental element that is out there,
in some sense, is assimilated or acquired by the participants, and functions as
a shared structure which is in turn a condition for certain performances that
cannot be explained or accounted for in any other way. A collective intention,
for example, is a fact beyond individual intentions and irreducible to them.
To assert an irreducible new thing is to make a new ontological commitment.
Traditionally, doctrines of collective intention have struggled with the question
of what sort of collective intender or collective fact is implied by the notion
of collective intention [Roth 2012], [Searle 1995, 2010], [Turner 1999]. An
individual intention can be recognized and acknowledged by others or made
the subject of agreement between people. Intersubjective agreement of this
sort does not raise these questions.
What makes these arguments transcendental arguments is that “Collective
Tacit Knowledge”, “collective intentionality”, and so forth are the conditions for
the possibility of outcomes that Collins and similar users of these arguments
believe cannot be explained in any other way. We are supposed to accept the
existence of Collective Tacit Knowledge and his characterization of it because
it meets this explanatory necessity. It is this general kind of conclusion that
will concern me here, as it has in many other places. The counterclaim is this:
the leap to a “collective” solution is unwarranted and the characterization of
things to be explained as themselves “collective” is also unwarranted. But here
I propose to explicitly discuss the distinction between collective and social in
general, with an eye to explaining its sources and the case to be made against
appeals to collective facts, as well as their undeniable attractions.
My basic point will be this: “Collective” mental objects, of which tacit
knowledge in Collins’s account is an instance, are accessible only through tran-
scendental arguments or arguments that share the problems of transcendental
arguments. What I will show here is that these arguments are, as a group,
defective in important ways that are relevant for any empirical explanatory
account of the subject matter of tacit knowledge. As I have noted, Collins
himself concedes one of the central issues with these accounts, the problem of
how Collective Tacit Knowledge is acquired. In contrast, “social” explanations,
that is to say those that involve interpersonal interactions and interpersonal
processes such as imitation, are not subject to these defects; however, social
mechanisms of the kinds that are generally known and accepted as genuine
causal and psychological processes, never produce, account for, or explain the
kinds of facts that collective accounts proceed from. But social explanations
have their own issues.
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To keep track of the relevant issues, it is useful to think in terms of a
scoreboard. The advantages of the “collective” model, in Collins’s case the
idea of Collective Tacit Knowledge, are these:
a) Fills an explanatory need in a simple, or single cause, and in this sense
“parsimonious” way (but see below on ontological non-parsimony).
b) Enables understanding of other people.
c) Enables claims about the content of what is tacit.
The disadvantages are these:
a) Underdetermination: as with all regress or transcendental arguments, the
Achilles heel of these arguments is the fact that the same overt results can
be accounted for in different and inconsistent ways.
b) The problem of location: it is difficult to get a coherent answer to the
question of where the collective stuff is located, and consequently how it
interacts with ordinary causal and interpersonal processes.
c) Transmission: there is no good way of accounting for how it is that the
collective stuff is acquired by individuals, especially of how it is that the
“same” stuff becomes part of the individual psychological or cognitive pro-
cesses that are directly involved in thought and action explanation.
d) Circularity: much depends, in these arguments, on characterizing the thing
to be explained in such a way that only collective explanations qualify as
explanations.
e) Ontological non-parsimony: the explanation requires ontological commit-
ment to a novel collective object, in this case Collective Tacit Knowledge.
“Individual” or “social interaction” accounts have their own issues, but they
come down to three major problems:
a) How can individual content and interactive processes operating between
individuals aggregate to produce collective outcomes, such as a common
language, co-operation, teams, joint collective action, and so forth?
b) How are we to understand meaning, language, the worldviews of others,
and practices if we do not treat these as collective facts?
c) How can we understand alien cultures and contexts of knowledge if not
by reference to their shared presuppositions, assumptions, tacit knowledge,
and meanings?
In short, despite the oddity of their claims, collective accounts seem to be
about something, and serve some important cognitive purposes. The question
is whether these purposes can be served by a better alternative explanation.
The focus of my discussion here will be with the undeniable intellectual
attractions of collective notions as means of achieving understanding. To know
that the people of the Middle Ages “assumed” something different than we do
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about God’s place in a hierarchical teleological order of the world, for exam-
ple, illuminates and makes intelligible some of the otherwise puzzling things
that they wrote and believed. So to vindicate non-collective social explana-
tions, these achievements also need to be accounted for, and in a way that
is consistent with a reasonable understanding of the mechanisms that these
non-collective social explanations employ. So in much of this article I will be
concerned with giving an account of what sort of understanding one gets by at-
tributing presuppositions, Collective Tacit Knowledge, and the like to a group
of people, or to the individuals that compose the “group”. This is also the focus
of much of Collins’s book as it relates to Collective Tacit Knowledge. Collins
deals with this problem under the heading of the problem of making tacit
knowledge explicit, something he does through the introduction of a series of
distinctions organized around the notion of strings and the distinction between
the physical and the meaningful, which he discusses in terms of transforma-
tions of strings as distinct from translation. My account will dispense with
the whole apparatus of presuppositions, strings, Collective Tacit Knowledge,
and the like as misleading and unnecessary. My concern will be with Collins’s
claims about what he calls “The Irreducibility of the Collectivity” [TEK, 124].
3 Some deep history
The idea of collective mental properties or possessions begins inadvertently,
with Kant. Kant contributed the idea of a transcendental argument and the
notion that our possibilities of experience were shaped by categories that were
the conditions of the pre-organized experience of the sort that we actually con-
versed and thought about. Such apparent features of the world as space and
causality were the products of this mental pre-organization. The underlying
organizing principles were tacit, though Kant did not use this language (in
fact there is a problem in translating the term tacit knowledge into German
in the first place, but the usual translation, Implizites Wissen, already trans-
forms it into a quasi-Kantian notion) in the sense that they were normally not
articulated, but could be.
Kant had no intention of introducing a “collective” account of these pre-
supposed conditions of thought. And despite the psychological language of the
mental of cognition that he employed, he insisted that he was not offering a
psychology at all, but rather an account of the logical conditions of knowing.
Nevertheless, someone had to possess these conditions, in some sense, to be a
knower. Kant thought that the most basic conditions at least were common
to all rational beings and indeed a condition of rationality. The philosophical
argument for their presence and necessity worked with two notions. The first
was the idea of a regress, in which premises needed to be justified by more
basic premises. The second was the idea that this kind of analysis could pro-
duce a unique result that excluded the possibility of alternative premises for
the same conclusions [Paulson 1992, 324–332]. If the claim to exclude alter-
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natives worked, it would obviate any need to consider the possibility that, for
example, different people had different presuppositions or implicit knowledge
yet nevertheless managed to get around in the world, and even communicate;
there would be only one possible set of presuppositions for everyone.
The neo-Kantians radicalized this argument by applying it not only to
the certain knowledge of the physical world supplied by physics, but to a
whole range of domains of thought in which objective knowledge was possible.
Hermann Cohen, the key radicalizer, applied the basic idea of a domain of
thought organized in a tacit but reconstructable logical hierarchy of concepts
to ethics, which he argued had the character of a logically organized domain
because jurisprudence, which was organized around a constitutive ethical con-
cept, was itself a logically organized domain. The “fact of science”, the fact
that there was an organized domain, implied that there was a set of presuppo-
sitions and a logical hierarchy of concepts that constituted it. The circularity
is evident in the characterization of the domain: what else could account for
a domain with this kind of conceptual order than an explanation of that or-
der, and what would explain it other than a hierarchical arrangement of the
concepts in terms of their logical relations?
Cohen interpreted this kind of analysis epistemologically as distinct from
psychologically, like Kant. Kant had made a great point of claiming that, as
Warren Schmaus put it, “he was not offering his theory of categories as an
empirical, psychological account of the origin of experience” [Schmaus 2004,
30], but rather of what was presupposed by experience. Thus, as Schmaus
paraphrases Kant, “to say, for instance, that the category of quantity is nec-
essary for experience [...] is to say only that one could not experience objects
without their having some quantity or another” [Schmaus 2004, 30–31]. But
the application of these ideas to historically specific domains, such as the law,
and then to the various academic disciplines, including theology, had the ef-
fect of localizing them to the individual members of these disciplines who were
actually “knowers” who thought in terms of the organized concepts of their
discipline. The trick of saying “one could not experience objects without their
having some quantity or other” does not work with the objects of specialized
disciplines: one can experience the actions of agents of the law without presup-
posing anything specifically “legal”. And one can understand the theological
beliefs of others without presupposing the existence of God. So the “condition-
ality” could not be bound to experience, and migrated to the knower. When
the idea of a domain constituted by hierarchically organized concepts was ex-
tended to the “historical a priori”, that is to say to the presuppositions of
a past epoch that distinguished it from our own, the localization was made
even more apparent. To say that people in the Renaissance experienced Il
Duomo differently than we do implies that the difference is in them, not in Il
Duomo. For localized domains, the categories and concepts involved were not
conditions of experience as such, but of the highly specific objectivity inducing
experiences of people who in some sense possessed the constituting concepts.
In the law, for example, this would be people trained in the law, who could
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agree on objective facts of legal science. Along with localization came an-
other shift, more subtle, from “experience” to “meaning”: thus the objective
facts of legal science were distinctive because they were legally meaningful,
and meanings in general became a special realm that had to be constituted by
presuppositions.
The presuppositions in these cases had to belong to the people who were of
the time, or of the discipline. And because the function of the presuppositions
was to assure or explain the “objectivity” of results in the domain, they had to
be uniform or shared. None of this was argued for: it was a given in the Kantian
lineage of the idea of objectivity and constitution. Because these were not
thought of as matters of psychology, but as matters of the logic of concepts—
Cohen, for example, claimed to be making inferences from the facts of universal
jurisprudence, a mythical discipline unconnected to actual lawyers—there was
no sense that a psychological account was needed. Eventually, various neo-
Kantians saw the need to provide accounts that made sense of the facts of
localization.
This contrast—epistemic or meaningful as distinct from psychological and
local or historical—produced a peculiar and confused result. What was the
relation between the fact of localization, the fact that only a set of related peo-
ple were knowers of this kind, and the epistemic content, the presuppositions,
themselves? Was it possible to avoid questions like “how were the presuppo-
sitions acquired by these knowers, and why did some people have them and
others not have them?” In short, can one historicize, socialize or sociologize
epistemology without at the same time psychologizing it?
For these localized presuppositions there was no avoiding the question of
where they came from and what sort of reality they had. The more common
and plausible solution to the problem of where the presuppositions came from
and had their real existence was to place them into some sort of collective
mind. The group mind is a solution to the problem created by localization.
But it is a concept with its own history. Ontologizing the problem of collective
mental life introduced a novel and problematic entity. Part of the Kantian
legacy was to separate mind and brain, which facilitated the idea that groups
could have minds without the causal accouterments of brains. But there were
still nagging problems about cause. If the presuppositions of the group are
not given in experience and thus accessible to individual reflection, they have
to be acquired. And if they are presupposed by experience, they have to be
acquired some way other than by ordinary learning, which operates through
experience, with empirical inputs, and produces individual mental results, like
habits and beliefs, rather than collective possessions. This is the core of the
transmission problem that Collins acknowledges but, like the neo-Kantians,
cannot solve.
The larger problem here is about the distinction between epistemic and
psychological inherited from Kant: the status of the presuppositions, con-
cepts, and categories which are the conditions of explicit knowledge. If we
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grant that they are logically required, does this imply that they are there-
fore necessarily causally real in some sense? This kind of reasoning seems to
generate causal claims from transcendental arguments. And there is a long
tradition of transcendental reasoning which implies something like this, but it
is vague or evasive about what is implied [Turner 2010, 14–30].
4 Separating the logical and the psycho-
logical
We think that there ought to be some sort of close relationship between the
logical and the psychological or the social: when we say “we” or “possession”, as
well as “knowledge”, we seem to be talking about something that is in people’s
heads and accessible, to some extent, to them. The fact that we can some-
times self-explicate our presuppositions, or make our tacit knowledge explicit
through explaining ourselves more fully, or do this for others by identifying
their presuppositions, seems to indicate that we are saying something about
what is already there in the mind. But the logical and the psychological work
in quite different ways. So this sense may simply be an illusion.
Consider the following comment by Hans Kelsen about the interpretation
of the League of Nations covenant, paragraph 1 of article 4. It reads “The
Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers [...]”. As he points out, it would have made the United States and
Japan permanent members of the council, despite the fact that the United
States never ratified the treaty and Japan withdrew. As Kelsen says:
[...] a literal interpretation of paragraph 1 certainly does not cor-
respond to the intentions of the authors of the statute. They
assumed as a fact that all the “Principal Powers” would ratify the
Treaty of Versailles at least and thereby become members of the
League. They did not think at all of the case where one of these
states, after having ratified the Treaty, would withdraw from the
League. They therefore refrained from stipulation that only mem-
bers of the League could be represented on the Council. [Kelsen
1939, 48]
The two middle sentences of this passage are related as follows: there is a
claim about an “assumption” and another claim about something “they did
not think at all”. The initial claim about what they assumed is not in conflict
with the second claim about the psychological fact about not having noticed
the possibility that countries would fail to ratify or leave the League. The
second claim is, rather, a clarification or psychological explanation of the first.
In this case the fact is not, however, an occurrent fact (i.e., something that
the person is currently conscious of or is otherwise manifest), but an omission
or absence of a psychological fact. Yet both the psychological claim and the
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“assumption” claim are true and they are consistent with one another. Indeed,
as Kelsen’s passage reads, the assumption claim is in some sense supported
and explained by the psychological one.
So what sort of fact is the fact about the assumption? One way of ap-
proaching this question is to ask for whom it is a fact. If it is not a fact in a
psychological sense of introspectability—one cannot introspect an omission—
it was therefore not an introspectable fact for the signatories. Is it a fact for
the interpreter, who is providing an explanation of the failure to make the
logically possible inference that countries might withdraw from the treaty? Is
the explanation the kind of explanation that makes the inference intelligible—
intelligible to the interpreter and the audience of the interpreter?
The issues here become a little clearer if we consider some different ways
of formulating Kelsen’s comment, and the relation between the “did not think”
and the “assumption” parts of the sentence. If we treat the assumption part as
an “as if” statement, namely that the writers of the document proceeded “as
if” nations would not withdraw from the covenant, we capture the meaning
without adding any term, such as assuming, that suggests something psycho-
logical or suggests that the “assumption” is a transcendental condition. The
sentence becomes one in which the “as if” clause allows us to give an intelli-
gible interpretation, though not necessarily a correct one. The notion of “as
if” is explicitly an appeal to a fiction in Vaihinger’s sense [Vaihinger 1911]:
it contradicts the actual psychological facts to say that the signatories actu-
ally “assumed” this. But it is a fiction that allows us to make sense of their
reasoning, which would otherwise be unintelligible.
It is a fiction that, for a particular audience, makes sense of the conduct of
the authors of the document. First, it is an audience that already understands
the meaning of the terms of the fiction. But second, the need for this particular
kind of sense-making is restricted to people who have noticed the problem of
withdrawal from the covenant, and only to those people. The people who wrote
the treaty did not need to think about, or use, the “assumption” because they
all failed to notice the issue. They also did not understand each other in the
fictive or hypothetical “as if” sense; they were living in a world in which this
possibility had not come to notice.
The failure to notice was a “failure” only from a different perspective. From
theirs, there was only agreement and mutual understanding, and nothing to
explain. They all noticed, and attended to, the same things. If we had the
power to appear from the future, and proposed a clause which resolved the
problem, they might say “we did not notice that”, or they might say “you are
assuming that nations will withdraw from the covenant”. But we wouldn’t have
“assumed” anything either. We would simply have had a different experience—
in this case the historical experience of withdrawals from the League. If we had
not had that experience, we might also fail to notice this possibility. Indeed, as
there was no legal procedure in the covenant for withdrawal, there is a sense in
which the possibility of withdrawal was itself invented by those who wished to
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withdraw, and by their insistence on treating the covenant as merely a treaty
which could be repudiated in the normal manner of formal repudiations of
treaties, something that was not intended or even imagined by the original
authors of the covenant.
This gets us to an odd result: claims about “assumptions” say no more
than “as if” claims. The point of appealing to claims, in this practical context
of interpretation, is to make sense of some belief or action that we do not
understand. The aid to understanding what claims about assumptions provide
is relative to the beliefs, noticings, and so forth of the persons interpreting the
claims. The correctness of claims about assumptions as well as the content
of the “as if” claims are relative to the specific misunderstanding, without a
misunderstanding there is nothing for the claim to be about.
This does not mean, however, that someone—the authors of the covenant,
for example—would not assent to the attribution of the assumption as a clar-
ification of what they meant, or even produce the “assumption” if they were
faced with a question that implied that withdrawal was possible. The ques-
tion itself, in this case, would have brought the possibility to notice, or at
least brought to notice the fact that the questioner had imagined this possi-
bility. So to answer “yes, that is what was assumed” tells us nothing about a
state of mind in the past. It is merely a retrospective interpretation provided
in response to a new question which implied a possibility that had not been
considered. This, indeed, is a model for what happens when the tacit is made
explicit: the person making the tacit explicit tells the hearer what he thinks
would enable the hearer to make sense of the relevant inferences.
5 What happens when the tacit is made
explicit?
The Kelsen example suggests that there is no stable object that corresponds
to such things as “presuppositions”. In his discussion of Collective Tacit
Knowledge, Collins is unequivocal that it is such as stable object: “knowl-
edge that is located in society” [TEK, 138], a “shared background of tacit
knowledge” that are necessary because they “work as conditions [of] communi-
cation” [TEK, 142], and so forth. The key to his argument against the bicycle
model is precisely that Collective Tacit Knowledge, unlike bodily tacit knowl-
edge, can be conveyed through language as well as through sharing physical
activities, and indeed that “Collective Tacit Knowledge is, to a large extent,
located in the language of the collectivity rather than its practices” [TEK,
135]. But according to Collins, the tacit knowledge of the individual who uses
the language and the knowledge located in it is knowledge of how to decode
strings. This creates a large puzzle, which cannot be pursued here: if the ma-
terial of interaction is strings, how does “language” relate to this, and how can
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“knowledge” be found in language, if language in its external sense consists of
strings?
One way of thinking of this is that the individual possesses presuppositions
that permit him or her to use the language, presuppositions that are somehow
transmitted along with the learning of the language itself. But are there
such things as these presuppositions that are shared and are the condition
of communication? Is there something collective shared in addition to the
language itself? Collins provides us with no argument that there is. He merely
asserts that the conditions of communication require it. But is this really so?
If we look past the problematic language of “presupposition” to the interactive
processes themselves, we get an image of social life and mutual understanding
like this: we interact with one another in terms of gestures and statements of
various kinds, which we interpret in ways that make sense to us. When they
do not, we quickly generate alternative ways to make sense of what we are
told. We can do this effortlessly and unconsciously. But on occasion we also
do it consciously and explicitly, for example in trying to understand people
who are very different from us and live in very different societies or hold very
different beliefs.
Take a simple example: it is customary for the Chinese to respond to
statements that are unwelcome or to which they object with silence—silence
conveys the message that the statement is objectionable. But would the person
who was raised with this custom be able to find the appropriate functional
substitute for it, when faced with a foreigner who was oblivious to the message
being sent by silence? Would the Chinese who were not aware of the specificity
of this custom, and for that matter the fact that it was a custom and not the
normal human response to unpleasant speech, even understand that the person
who was behaving badly by continuing to speak in an unwelcome way was in
need of an explanation of the silence?
This case is a simple example of tacit knowledge being made explicit. It
is found in business travelers books on how to behave in China. The behavior
of the Chinese is interpreted as a rule which can be formulated as an explicit
functional substitute, “silence means that the person is waiting for you to say
something different and more welcome”. But this is a rule for someone in a
culture in which there is an expectation that people signal and then explain
their displeasure with an utterance. If the traveler was from a culture in
which every act was interpreted in terms of status and therefore deference, and
deference needed to be acknowledged, the advice might be “silence means that
your hearer expects you to show deference by saying something acknowledging
his displeasure as well as his status”.
They are functional substitutes only for people whose expectations are
formed by those societies. “We” are unaccustomed to thinking in terms of
prestige and deference, and would need to have the specific concepts of prestige
and deference translated, explained, and illustrated with examples before we
would find the second rule usable. Neither rule is in the head of the Chinese
88 Stephen Turner
ready to be made explicit—indeed, treating these as “rules” at all is merely to
employ a convenient analogy. They are rules for travelers to use to interpret
behavior and act in ways that are functional substitutes for the way they
would act within their own society. But they are substitutes only. Truly
fluent interaction, of the kind that is possible in the situations in which one is
most familiar, would involve the full use of our capacity to attribute intentions
and beliefs to others, our capacity to repair and revise attributions, and our
capacity to make ourselves understood by others who have misinterpreted us
by providing repairs to their inferences.
This way of formulating the problem of what it is that we do when we
articulate tacit knowledge has the effect of shifting the problem from the act
of stating the tacit to the social interaction between the person doing the
stating and the person for whom the stating is being done. In discussing
the Kelsen quote, I have already stressed the sharp differences between the
psychological facts and the use of the notion of “assumption”. Assertions about
“assumptions”, this discussion suggested, are better understood as attempts
to provide functional substitutes for a particular audience, often an audience
different from the audience in the original setting; in the case of the signatories
of the League of Nations, the original audience being the diplomats of the
day and the other audience being the later observers who experienced the
withdrawal of states and wondered why this wasn’t provided for in the treaty
itself. But the use of the term “audience” raises a different problem, about
“sharing”, a notion to which, as we have seen, Collins also appeals.
As I have noted, we are routinely called upon to explain ourselves to people
who don’t understand us, and we do so by empathically imagining what it is
that they have wrongly inferred or wrongly believe or “assume” that we can
correct by providing information that will repair the relevant inference. This
interactive process does not appeal, in any essential way, to the notion of rules,
or to anything “collective” or shared. “Functional substitutes” are invented
on the fly as a normal part of interaction, and the ability to do this, which
depends perhaps on our capacity to empathically think through or simulate
the thinking of the other, applies to a huge variety of tasks, including the
understanding of historical figures. When Kelsen explains the thinking of the
original negotiators of the League of Nations treaty provisions, similarly, the
explanation is one that could just as well be applied to a single individual:
Woodrow Wilson, for example.
These attempts at explanation, like the rule about the meaning of silence
for the Chinese, are audience relative and underdetermined, just as our uncon-
scious supplying or inventing of presuppositions is. The fact that we interact
with people who are similar to us in many respects means that our usual infer-
ences about the actions of others, their intentions, the relations between their
words and deeds, and the inferential relations between the different kinds of
things they say become habitualized and automatic. Moreover, our interac-
tions with others increase the extent to which our habitualized responses serve
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the purposes of understanding the people around us. To the extent that there
is tacit knowledge, it is contained in these habitualized responses.
There is nothing “collective” or even “social” about this: the habits are ours
as individuals. The social element is found in the capacity to guess what other
people need to know in order to understand us when an interaction goes wrong,
our capacity to invent and attribute inferences to others—to repair what has
gone wrong when our habitualized responses fail, or those of the person we
are interacting with fail. This capacity to read their minds and determine
what they need to be told explicitly to repair the interaction may be rooted
in such parts of the neuro-cognitive system as mirror neurons and simulation.
But in any case these capacities are social rather than collective in their reach.
The diplomats who signed the treaty establishing the League of Nations, like
Woodrow Wilson himself, failed individually to anticipate withdrawals from
the treaty. Saying “we” failed is simply to record this fact, not to invoke a
collective mind or common mental processes leading to this failure. Similarly
for the notion of audience I have employed here. It is merely a collection of
individuals, not a body with some sort of shared collective mental content. If
this is a correct account of what goes on when the tacit is made explicit, there
is no explanatory need to appeal to Collective Tacit Knowledge, and therefore
nothing for it to explain, parsimoniously or otherwise.
6 The scorecard
The “scorecard” with which I began was a list of issues with collective ac-
counts and with their rival non-collective social accounts. How do these issues
look after these considerations? It no longer looks as though Collective Tacit
Knowledge fills an explanatory need in a simple, “parsimonious” way. It fills
one need, the need for sense-making, by attributing presuppositions to a col-
lective object; at the same time it ignores the problem of how this collective
object gets into people’s heads. Moreover, it requires a new ontological com-
mitment to the collective object itself. This can only be justified by a claim
of explanatory necessity: we don’t have independent access to this object.
But it is not clear that there is an explanatory need that the concept fills:
we can account for understanding in an ontologically more parsimonious way
by reference to social rather than collective processes. The understanding of
other people enabled by the idea of Collective Tacit Knowledge and the con-
tent it supposedly gives us access to turn out to be more readily accounted
for by our capacity to invent inference repairs. It is of course possible to
describe the things to be explained in ways that force us to appeal to col-
lective facts. But it is always possible to describe these differently without
loss of empirical content.
The idea of Collective Tacit Knowledge, like all similar ideas, faces some
basic issues related to the idea that these were stable objects of some kind. One
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was underdetermination: there is no stable thing corresponding to “presuppo-
sitions” or tacit knowledge. There are, rather, multiple possible explications,
some of which will be intelligible to certain audiences, none of which is uniquely
determinate. One might insist that this inaccessibility through regress argu-
ments is precisely the point: the shared tacit stuff is mentally inaccessible,
tacit in the deepest sense, but still shared. But to say this creates another
problem: if the stuff is inaccessible, how did it get into the heads of the people
who supposedly possess it in the first place? This is the downloading problem,
and it is insoluble: even if there was a stable determinate object that was
shared, it would be impossible to explain how this stable object was related to
the fact of activity and the constant flux created by normal social interaction.
The fact that the location of this supposed object and the problem of its inter-
action with the causal world has been a problem ever since Kant, and indeed
the sheer diversity of conceptions about what is supposedly out there or in
the mind, and where it is located, suggests that there is no stable determinate
object of this kind.
Can “individual” or “social interaction” accounts avoid these problems yet
account for what needs accounting for: a common language, co-operation,
teams, joint collective action, practices, and so forth? All of these involve
mixtures of explicit beliefs, habits, mutual understandings, and sometimes
common material objects. They all work through interaction, interaction that
pushes inferences into the habitual and therefore tacit. The mystery elements
in these phenomena are the aspects that are inaccessible to consciousness or
accessible only through the attribution of presuppositions. If we understand
presuppositions in the sense of David Lewis, there is no mystery. The constant
invention of these things is a normal part of social interaction. There is nothing
that needs to be located outside the mind, transmitted, downloaded, or to
exist in some mysterious causal relation to ordinary cognitive processes. The
creation of these repairs is an ordinary cognitive process. Cultures and the
like are not things with essences or jointly motivating spirits. They are not
causes at all. These terms are simply aggregate descriptions and typifications
of what people do and believe, and they do habitually and therefore tacitly
that is different from what we do.
Collins is a major representative of what could be understood as a nat-
uralistic approach to the study of science, beginning with what he called
the Empirical Programme of Relativism [Collin 2011, 83–108], [Collins 1981].
The most famous text on naturalistic epistemology, Quine’s “Epistemology
Naturalized”, took the view that epistemology would eventually collapse into
or be replaced by scientific knowledge of the process of knowing [Quine 1969].
Kant’s distinction between psychology and the epistemic was the target of
this claim, just as Kant’s analytic synthetic distinction was the target of “Two
Dogmas of Empiricism” [Quine 1951]. It is not a small irony that Collins proves
to be the heir not of naturalism, but of Kant and these two problematic dis-
tinctions, as they were carried through in the equally problematic tradition of
the collective mind.
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